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Google uses Prediction Markets internally for Strategic Insight

Saturday, September 24th, 2005

Art Hutchinson reports that Google blogged their use of prediction markets. Here are some excerpts from Google’s blog:

The markets were designed to forecast product launch dates, new office openings, and many other things of strategic importance to Google. So far, more than a thousand Googlers have bid on 146 events in 43 different subject areas (no payment is required to play).

We designed the market so that the price of an event should, in theory, reflect a consensus probability that the event will occur…the average price, which is how often outcomes in that group should actually happen according to market prices…[and] how often they did happen…they're pretty close. So our prices really do represent probabilities - very exciting!

Our search engine works well because it aggregates information dispersed across the web, and our internal predictive markets are based on the same principle: Googlers from across the company contribute knowledge and opinions which are aggregated into a forecast by the market.

Art predicts that Google will start offering prediction markets as a service.

Notes from Wolfers and Zitzewitz paper on Prediction Markets

Wednesday, August 31st, 2005

Here are my notes on the paper, Prediction Markets, by Justin
Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz

Accuracy

Wolfers and Zitzewitz recently published Interpreting Prediction Market Prices as Probabilities that claims that “prediction market prices are usually close to the mean beliefs of traders” and concludes…

with
some guidance for practitioners. In most cases we find that prediction
market prices aggregate beliefs very well. Thus, if traders are
typically well-informed, prediction market prices will aggregate
information into useful forecasts. The efficacy of these forecasts may
however be undermined somewhat for prices close to $0 or $1, when the
distribution of beliefs is either especially disperse, or when trading
volumes are somehow constrained, or motivated by an unusual degree of
risk-acceptance.

Limitations

Thin Markets


…the HP (forecasting printer sales) and Siemens (predicting delivery
of sofware on schedule) experiences suggested that motivating employees
to trade was a major challenge. In each case, the firms ran real money
exchanges, with only a relatively small trading population (20-60
people), and subsidized participation in the market, by either endowing
traders with a portfolio or matching initial deposits. The predictive
performance of even these very thin markets was quite striking.

Possibilities for Arbitrage


Prediction markets appear to present few opportunities for arbitrage.

Gaming the Market


In most cases, the time series of prices in these markets does not
appear to follow a predictable path and simple betting strategies based
on past prices appear to yield no profit opportunities.



Small Probablility Events


People tend to overvalue small probabilities and undervalue near
certainties (The “volatility smile” in options refers to a related
pattern in financial markets.) It is likely that prediction markets
will also perform poorly at predicting small probability events.


Another behavioral bias reflects the tendency of market participants to
trade according to their desires, rather than their objective
probability assessments. …as long as marginal trades are
motivated by profits rather than partisanship, prices will reflect the
assessments of (unbiased) profit motive.

Criteria for Success

For a prediction market to work well
1. Contracts must be clear, easily understood, and easily adjudicated.
2. A motivation to trade must exist. Perhaps simply through the thrill of pitting one’s judgment against others
3. There must be some disagreement about likely outcomes. “Disagreement
is unlikely among fully rational traders with common priors. It is more
likely to occur when traders are overconfident in the quality of their
private information or in their ability to process public information
or when they have priors that are sufficiently
different to allow them to agree to disagree.”
4. There must be useful intelligence to aggregate. Public information cannot be selective, inaccurate, or misleading.

Types of contracts
All contracts assume risk neutrality - that risk doesn't affect
investors' decisions becuase the amounts being wagered are small.

Winner-takes-all: contract pays
off if and only if a specific event occurs. The price on a
winner-take-all market represents the market’s expectation of the
probability that an event will occur.

Index: contract pays off an amount that varies based on a numeric
outcome, say, the percentage of  the popular vote or the number of
printers sold. The contract price represents the mean value that the
market assigns to the outcome.

“Spread” betting: traders bid on the cutoff that determines whether an
event occurs, like point-spread betting in football, where the bet is
either that one team will win by at least a certain number of points, or will not. The price of the bet is fixed,
but the size of the spread can adjust. When spread betting is combined
with an even-money bet (that is, winners double their money while
losers receive zero), the outcome can yield the market’s expectation of
the median outcome because this is only a fair bet if a payoff is as
likely to occur as not.

Families of winner-takes-all contracts can reveal the probability distribution of the
market’s expectations.

Open Source Prediction Markets

Tuesday, August 30th, 2005

Art Hutchinson alerted me to an open-source prediction market platform newly released by Foresight Technologies.

From the Foresight Technologies site

Idea Futures helped birth the prediction market industry when it was first developed over a decade ago.  The platform continues to power the web's first and longest-running prediction market, the Foresight Exchange…

Mike Linksvayer reports on two other options: Zocalo and FreeMarket 

Here is a comprehensive software list from Chris Masse

Open-Source Platform for Prediction Markets in Development

Thursday, March 31st, 2005

Chris Hibbert introduces himself and the Zocalo project (link). He writes:

The proposal has now been issued as CN-TR-05-02: Zocalo: An Open-Source Platform for Deploying Prediction Markets. The presentation I gave at the workshop is up on the DIMACS web site. And my job is to make it all happen…

The goal of the project is the development of an open source toolkit
for creating Prediction Markets and of a community of interestd users…

Trials of prediction markets
are demonstrating their usefulness, but people who want to make use of
them are handicapped by not having access to tools that make them
straightforward to deploy. Zocalo is intended to fix that problem.

Our initial users will be experimental economists…Later applications will include trials in
industrial settings and eventually public markets for prizes or real
money…

I'd appreciate
contacts from economists who would like help setting up experimental
prediction markets, or others who are interested in exploring
deployment of prediction markets to answer important questions within
your organization.


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